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There
have been many attempts to bring an end to the conflict through
initiatives designed to achieve
reconciliation and normalization. In
particular, the Baku Bae process was an attempt to achieve peace
at the
grassroots level. But persistent failures were accompanied by a resurgence
of violence. In
order to try to salvage this situation, towards the end of
last year, the Government initiated a new
series of negotiations, which
resulted in the recent Malino Agreements. The first Malino Agreement
related to Sulawesi; the most recent, concluded in February 2002, covers
Maluku.
It
is clearly of the utmost importance for Indonesia that these Agreements
should be accepted and
implemented. If they can be successfully
maintained, and stability can be restored to Maluku and
Sulawesi, there
can be hope not only for the people who are suffering so much, but also
hope for the
future peoples – that their government can demonstrate
its ability to protect the principles of religious
tolerance and
democratic freedoms. Conversely, failure of the Malino Agreements would
bring
widespread disillusionment and fear that the government is incapable
of maintaining law, freedom,
stability and protection of its own citizens.
Current
Situation
The
violent conflict in Moluccas has now entered its fourth year. While the
majority of Christians and
Muslims are weary of the violence and fully
support the reconciliation efforts, a militant Islamist group
Laskar Jihad
is trying its best to sabotage the current efforts and to restart the
violence. The
Indonesian government is one of the signatories to the
Malino II agreement relating to Maluku and is
responsible for the law
enforcement and security aspects.
Recent
developments are a cause for grave concern as the there have been a number
of attacks
on Muslims supporting reconciliation and on joint
Muslim/Christian peace meetings
in an attempt to
raise tensions in the region. The Indonesian government
has yet to take any measures against the
perpetrators.
Laskar Jihad
Laskar
Jihad first came to international attention when they called for a Jihad (holy
war) against the
Christians in the Moluccas at a mass rally held in Jakarta in
January 2000. They recruited some
10,000 volunteers who were then trained
at an Islamist training camp in Yogyakarta. Some 2000
militants arrived in
the Moluccas in April 2000, and are considered to be responsible for a majority of
the violence in the region. Apart from attacking the Christian
communities, the militants also attack
Muslims engaged in reconciliation
and police and military authorities attempting to prevent their
attacks on
Christian communities.
Laskar
Jihad is widely acknowledged to have links with international Islamist
movements in Saudi
Arabia, Yemen, Malaysia and Philippines, although Mr.
Thalib, an Afghan veteran, denies any
involvement with Osama Bin Laden and
the Al Qaeda network.
According
to Government officials, around 3000 members of the Muslim militant group,
Laskar Jihad,
still remain in the Moluccas. They have declared their
intent to resolve the ‘Christian problem’ by
force and are sending
‘reinforcements’ into the area to achieve their goal. In the last few
months,
Laskar Jihad has also sent several thousand militants to Poso
region in Sulawesi and reports
suggest that Mr. Thalib has just visited
Papua/Irian Jaya and Aceh. All of these regions, apart from
Aceh, have a
substantial Christian minority or majority. It seems that Laskar Jihad is
trying to
capitalize on the public sentiment against the military strike
on Afghanistan by widening its focus to
include all Christian communities
in Indonesia.
Mr.
Thalib is reportedly still under house arrest following his arrest in May
2000 for the murder of
one of his followers and for inciting violence
against an ethnic/religious group.
Roots of the
Moluccas conflict
While
the two communities have co-existed peacefully for centuries, tensions
have been building in
the Moluccas in recent years. The traditional
structures of authority and alliances between villages
(Gandong and Pela
respectively) have been steadily eroded by the transmigration policies of
Suharto, bringing to the islands an influx of predominantly Muslim settlers,
upsetting the delicate
balance. The gradual change of the demographics of
the islands from a Christian majority towards a
Muslim one coincided also
with an increasing of Christians within the local government, the military
and the police force. In the later years of his rule, President Suharto is
believed to have encouraged
the growth of Islamist movements in exchange
for political backing.
Reports
abound of agent provocateurs fuelling the conflict through misinformation
and conspiracy
theories. Suharto-backed parties and the Islamist elements
are presented as prime candidates by
most specialists. Members of the
security forces are accused of fuelling the conflict and are reported
to
be fighting on both sides. Security forces are also reportedly allowing
militants from other parts of
Indonesia to travel to the Moluccas
islands
in order to participate in the conflict. Both communities
accuse the
military of assisting their adversaries. While it is often difficult to
ascertain the facts from the
rumors and biased media coverage, there
appears to be sufficient evidence to sustain the claims of
an orchestrated
campaign aimed at destabilizing the region and Islamizing the Moluccas
Islands. A
state of civil emergency was imposed by the Indonesian
government on June 27, 2000, but it had
no discernible effect on the
conflict, which has been ongoing since January 1999.
While
there is evidence of Christians using violence other than for reasons of
self-defense, these
have tended to be isolated incidents committed by a
small minority. The majority of the violence has
reportedly been
instigated by Islamist elements, often brought in from other parts of
Indonesia to
inflame the situation locally. For example, there were
unconfirmed reports, prior to the violence in
Lombok, of fliers being
circulated in the area inciting people to join the holy war in the
Moluccas.
Local Christian communities fear that the Islamist elements in
the military and government are working
according to a blueprint to drive
out all Christians out of the Moluccas.
Some recent
incidents
March
12, 2002 Tual, Kei Islands, South-East Moluccas
An
opening ceremony was held marking the beginning of the Moluccas Second
Division of the
Indonesian League. This is seen as an important step in
reconciliation, as Moluccas has never held
an official football
competition.
March 2 Ambon City
A
peaceful Muslim-Christian peace rally in Ambon city on March 2, was marred
by violence after a
group of unidentified attackers set on the marchers
with machetes and stones. Over 3000 Moluccans
came together to show their
support for the reconciliation process. Two people were reportedly
hospitalized with serious injuries while two other people suffered slight
cuts. Six people are still be-
lieved to be missing. The rally was the first
time in years that many Christians and Muslims had
mingled freely, having
previously been segregated into religious districts as a result of the
conflict.
March 1 Ambon City
The
government announced the end to provocative reporting. Despite this, SPMM,
the Laskar Jihad
mouthpiece in the region, has been allowed to continue
its broadcasts inciting hatred and violence.
February 25 Ambon City
A
bus carrying Christian government employees from Tulehu was attacked while
driving through the
Muslim area of Galunggung, a Laskar Jihad stronghold.
February 13
Ambon City
Four
large bomb explosions on the eve of the return of the Malino delegations
marked a week of
violent incidents within the Muslim community. Reportedly
houses of two of the Muslim delegates
were bombed. The Muslim delegates
car was pelted with stones on the way
to the city. About ten
delegates sought shelter at the Governor’s
residence for few days.
January 2002 Palu, Sulawesi
Four
churches bombed in Palu, Sulawesi on New Years eve. Miraculously no one
was killed.
2001
Gonzalo
Veloso Catholic compound, Ambon city (capital of Moluccas)
The
Catholic complex, which houses several hundred refugees and includes a
Catholic teaching
center has been under a heavy attack by the Laskar Jihad
militants for the past week. While the
security officials stationed there
(both military and police units) have stopped the militants from taking
hold of the complex they have been unable to stop the attack. It is
believed that the Laskar Jihad is
attempting to occupy the compound, so it
can be used as a training camp. Gonzalo Vesolo is also
strategically
located and would allow the militants easy access to the Christian neighborhoods
of
Belakang Soya, Batumeja and others surrounding the
compound.
Wamulang
village, Buru Island
Several
hundred militants attacked the second largest Christian village on Buru on
November 1.
Four Christians and an army officer are feared dead and more
than a thousand villagers were
forced to run for their lives to the
surrounding jungle as militant Jihad warriors burned their homes to
the
ground. The local police and military units did attempt to stop the attack
but they were out-
numbered. The regional government has sent food and
emergency assistance into the area.
Mercy Corps has also sent blankets,
tarpaulins etc for temporary shelters. The military (TNI) is said
to in
control of the village. However, the incident has created increasing
tension between the two
communities.
Ambon
City
A
bomb exploded in Ambon city on Monday, November 12, killing two people and
injuring
around 20 people.
Jakarta
A
church was bombed on Friday November 9 in North Jakarta. The bomb exploded
during a
special church service on the Moluccas situation.
Conclusions
Indonesia
is a moderate Muslim country with a history of religious tolerance.
Therefore it is a great
tragedy that a small number of Islamist militants
are able to tarnish Indonesia’s international reputation
and to sabotage
these genuine moves to peace without any repercussions. Given the freedom
with
which these militant Islamist organizations
are able to operate, it
does suggest high-level support from
members of the government and the
military. It is vital that the Indonesian government takes strong
and
effective measures to curb the activities of the militants and to support
the current Malino
agreements with concrete action.
The
international community has a key role to play in offering assistance both
in terms of expertise
and funding to the Malino process, to help it
surmount enormous obstacles to reach a successful
conclusion.
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